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Abstract: We reexamine the existence of an upward trend in the idiosyncratic volatility (IV) of US-
listed stocks between 1962 and 2000 documented in CLMX2001. Following the same methodology as
in their paper, we confirm the upward trend and the subsequent reversal, as reported by BHZ2012.
However, taking a closer look, we find that this result is influenced by microstructure biases in realized
variances and correlations based on daily returns. Correcting these biases, we find that, depending on
whether we use equal- or value-weighted IV and whether we include the pre-NASDAQ period, between 17
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ABSTRACT
We reexamine the existence of an upward trend in the idiosyn-
cratic volatility (IV) of US-listed stocks between 1962 and
2000 documented in Campbell et al. (2001). Following the
same methodology as in their paper, we confirm the upward
trend and the subsequent reversal, as reported by Bekaert et al.
(2012). However, taking a closer look, we find that this result
is influenced by microstructure biases in realized variances and
correlations based on daily returns. Correcting these biases,
we find that, depending on whether we use equal- or value-
weighted IV and whether we include the pre-NASDAQ period,
between 17% and 62% of the trend is removed. Also, the subse-
quent reversal of IV is almost entirely removed once we correct
for these biases. We also highlight the mechanical dependence
of the IV measure on industry concentration. From 1962 to
2000, industry concentration also contributes to a higher IV.
However, its effect remains quantitatively small.
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1 Introduction
It is the consensus that the US equity market in the period from the
1960s to the early 2000s experienced a strengthening role of idiosyncratic
(or firm-level) volatility (IV) relative to the systemic component of market
risk, as discussed in Campbell et al. (2001), hereafter CLMX. Furthermore,
recent studies indicate that the aggregate level of idiosyncratic risk reverted
around 2000 to the levels observed in the 1960s and systemic risk regained
its importance.1 At the same time, there is a large body of literature that
tries to explain these trends, but no general agreement has been reached
about the underlying causes generating the observed trends.2
In this paper, we challenge the consensus. We first replicate the analysis
of Campbell et al. (2001) and confirm their main result of the upward trend
in idiosyncratic volatility in 1962-1997 period, as well as the reversal of the
IV in more recent studies. However, we show that both of those empirical
findings are, to a nontrivial degree, driven by the variation in the severity
of microstructure biases of daily-return data in the CRSP database, and by
nar participants at the University of Zurich, the University College Dublin, the SwissQuant
Scientific Board Meeting, the AFFI Conference 2018 (Paris), the 2018 Financial Economet-
rics Conference on Market Microstructure, Limit Order Books and Derivative Markets at the
University of Lancester, and the 9th International Conference of the Financial Engineering
and Banking Society in Prague, and the anonymous referee or their feedback.
1See, for example, Brown and Kapadia (2007), Bali et al. (2008), Brandt et al. (2010),
and Bekaert et al. (2012). These studies provide various explanations of the change in IV,
such as changes in institutional ownership, and growth options. Most recently, Bartram
et al. (2018) argue that for 2013 to 2017 IV was historically low.
2A large literature tries to explain the trends in IV, for example, by an increase in
competition (Comin and Philippon, 2005; Gaspar and Massa, 2006; Pontiff and Irvine,
2009), increased R&D spending and Schumpeterian destruction (Chun et al., 2008; Comin
and Mulani, 2009), financial development (Brown and Kapadia, 2007), institutional own-
ership (Xu and Malkiel, 2003; Bennett et al., 2003), irrational exuberance (Brandt et al.,
2010), young firms (Fink et al., 2010; Bekaert et al., 2012), profitability (Wei and Zhang,
2006), and macroeconomic factors (Bekaert et al., 2012). Bartram et al. (2018) use firm
characteristics to explain why IV was historically low from 2013 to 2017, compared to the
period from 1963 to 2012.
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changes in industry concentration.3 When we account for microstructure
biases, the trend is weaker by 17% in the value-weighted, and by 34%
in the equal-weighted case. The contribution of microstructure biases is
even larger when we consider a shorter window starting in 1972, when
NASDAQ universe joined the CRSP database, with trend estimates lower
by 44% in the value-weighted case, and by 62% in the equal-weighted
case. Moreover, once we eliminate the biases, there is no longer a striking
reversal in the IV series. The changes in the magnitude of the biases reflect
events such as changes to tick size requirements, and data-related aspects,
e.g., increasing availability of trading prices in the CRSP database.
To motivate our claim with an illustration, we Panel A of Figure 1
plots the price process for National Mobile Corp listed on the NASDAQ
SmallCap. For this stock, the price quotation changed from midpoint to
closing price around June 15, 1992. After this change, the price oscillates
between bid and ask quotes, depending on whether the last order was
a buy or a sell order. This phenomenon is commonly referred to as the
bid-ask bounce. It results in higher volatility of closing prices compared
to the underlying “efficient” price derived from the variation in expected
(and appropriately discounted) future cash flows. Panel B of Figure 1
shows that the average effect of this switch on realized volatility across all
stocks is roughly 100%. Hence, the realized volatility on average doubles
when closing prices become available. Hence, when estimating IV, we must
control for the type of price quotation, particularly for the early CRSP data
where some price observations are quote midpoints rather than closing
prices.4
The transition from midpoint quotations to closing prices has not been
3Changes in industry concentration correspond to the growth in the number of listed
firms before 2000 and its recent decrease, which complicates the comparison of the CLMX
measure of aggregate idiosyncratic volatility at different points in time.
4Because the bid-ask bounce results in less frequent zero returns, using the frequency of
zero returns as a liquidity proxy, as proposed, e.g., by Lesmond et al. (1999), is problematic
when using historical CRSP data, because it depends on the availability of closing price
rather than liquidity. Microstructure effects also provide a plausible explanation that in the
CLMX sample, if we move from daily to monthly sampling frequency, the average variance
decreases, while average correlation and portfolio (industry, market) variances increase.
Consistent with stronger microstructure effects for small, illiquid stocks, the choice of
sampling frequency has a more pronounced effect on equally-weighted measures. Recent
reversal coincides with exogenous events of decimalization. Both on market and stock
level, all of those effects seem difficult to justify on the grounds of fundamental factors.
4 Leippold and Svatoň
Figure 1: Midpoint vs. closing price realized volatility.
Description: Panel A: Example of the price series of a stock (National Mobile Corp) around
NASDAQ SmallCap’s change from midpoint quotation to closing price. The vertical line
denotes the date of the change in price type. Panel B: Monthly realized volatility computed
from daily returns of stocks around the first date of availability of their trading prices. We
do not include stocks for which the first trading price is available in its first 60 observations
because a lack of trading prices might reflect low liquidity rather than data availability.
Month zero refers to the period of the first 22 days after the quotation change.
Interpretation: Stock prices in CRSP database are recorded either as a closing price or
as a quote midpoint. Only closing prices are affected by bid-ask bounce, which inflates
realized variances.
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the only change. Between 1962 to 2001, a series of fundamental institu-
tional changes occurred, all with the potential to substantially affect IV
measurement.5 We classify them into three broad categories. The first
category, as exemplified in Figure 1, relates to the way how prices are
recorded in the CRSP database.6 The second category concerns the addi-
tion of new stocks to the CRSP database. For example, in December 1972,
NASDAQ stocks were added, increasing the number of riskier firms in the
sample. The third category relates to the tick size requirements. In 1997,
the tick size reduction from 1/8 to 1/16 significantly reduced dollar bid-ask
spreads on NYSE, NASDAQ, and Amex. Finally, in April 2001, all the stock
exchanges adopted decimal quotes, which led to reduction of spreads. As a
consequence, microstructure effects in daily returns quantitatively become
negligible after this date.
The CLMX measure of idiosyncratic volatility depends on an interaction
of volatilities, correlations, and weights assigned to individual stocks, which
complicates the direct analysis of the role of microstructure effects and the
role of changing the number of firms, or more generally, of capital concen-
tration. To facilitate our empirical analysis, we provide an approximation
of IV measure of CLMX as a product of average variance, average within-
industry correlation, and industry concentration. With this approximation,
we can match the IV series to a high degree of accuracy. Therefore, we
analyze each of these channels separately. In particular, we ask which one
is the main driver for the potential trend in the CLMX period and whether
it is robust when we adjust for different microstructure biases.
We find that microstructure biases are mainly caused by the bid-ask
bounce and price asynchronicity, both of which are amplified by price dis-
creteness.7 Unsurprisingly, the bid-ask bounce impact is most substantial
for stocks with wide effective spreads. However, it turns out that an addi-
5We give an overview of all these changes in Table 1 of the Online Appendix.
6For instance, for NASDAQ stocks, no trading prices were initially available, so the
recorded prices were quote midpoints. As a consequence, realized variance estimates on
NASDAQ in the 1970s were free of bid-ask bounce effects. For more information, we refer
to the Data Description Guide for CRSP US Stock & US Index Databases (update as of
March 31, 2017).
7Market microstructure typically entails a much broader set of phenomena, see Aït-
Sahalia and Yu (2009) for a discussion. In this study, we use the term “market microstructure”
to refer to effects that we control for in our analysis: bid-ask bounce, price discreteness,
and asynchronicity.
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tional critical factor is the way prices are recorded in the CRSP database
because they can represent either a closing price or a quote midpoint. Trad-
ing prices, which are unlike quote midpoints prone to the bid-ask bounce,
were unavailable for any NASDAQ stocks before 1982 and for NASDAQ
SmallCap stocks before 1992. This subtle difference leads to substantial
bias in variances only in the 1980s and not immediately after the inclusion
of NASDAQ in the sample.
In addition to the bid-ask bounce, asynchronicity and price discreteness
further impact correlation estimates. Indeed, these effects explain the ob-
servation of CLMX that, in their sample, the correlation estimates based on
daily frequency are well below those obtained with monthly returns. More-
over, the bias in correlations reconciles the fact that in the CLMX sample,
industry and market variances are higher on lower frequencies, despite the
abundant evidence of bid-ask bounce effect, which is weaker at lower fre-
quencies. The data also show other symptoms of the asynchronicity such as
the incidence of zero daily returns, which peaks in the CLMX sample at 50%
of daily returns in a given month. After quote decimalization around 2001,
the wedge between correlation estimates based on different frequencies
disappears, and so does the frequency of zero returns. In turn, the shrinking
of the asynchronicity bias contributes to a drop in the IV estimates. For
the value-weighted IV, the effect of correlation biases is modest because
most weight lies on correlations between large, liquid stocks. However, the
channel remains important for equal-weighted measure and for industry
and market components.
Having identified the primary sources of microstructure biases, we
explicitly correct for the biases in two ways. First, for the variances, we
not only borrow from the literature (Roll, 1984; Hasbrouck, 2009), but we
also develop a novel model, which we tailor to take into account features
of both the microstructure and the CRSP data. Second, for the correlations,
we provide a simple approximation of the bias based on the frequency of
zero returns. The bias-corrected results show that the average variances
on individual exchanges are free of a trend. On the aggregate market, a
value-weighted measure of IV exhibits a stable long-term mean, only with
surprisingly low variance in the very beginning of the sample period. The
equal-weighted IV retains a small portion of the trend, which reflects the
fact that NASDAQ, composed of stocks with higher variance, grew faster in
numbers than NYSE in that period.
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We also explore the dependence of the CLMX measure of IV on industry
concentration, which establishes a direct link with market size and the
industry classification used.8 Empirically, the industry concentration chan-
nel explains only a part of the IV changes and has a stronger influence on
the systemic risk components. Its effect is stronger for value-weighted IV
(roughly 18% of the trend estimate), for which the concentration varied
more substantially.
In a related study, Lesmond et al. (2018), hereafter LPSZ, attribute the
trend to the bid-ask bounce, which was eliminated with quote decimaliza-
tion.9 We deviate from LPSZ along three dimensions. First, we show that
the trend is not driven purely by bias in variance estimates, but also by
microstructure biases in correlation, and by variation in industry concen-
tration. Second, we introduce a novel model that explicitly corrects for
microstructure biases. The model also accounts for the structural changes
(e.g., tick-size reductions) and data-related events (e.g., changes to the
availability of quote and price data), which is crucial for explaining the
timing of the IV increase observed by CLMX.10 Third, we consider not only
the value-weighted IV but also the equal-weighted measure. It provides a
more robust “test” of the microstructure explanation because it puts more
substantial weight on small stocks, which are more prone to microstructure
effects.
We organize the paper as follows. In Section 2, we review the CLMX
framework for IV measurement and provide its accurate approximation,
which decomposes the IV to three separate drivers. In Section 3, we
analyze the individual drivers and the role of microstructure biases in their
8Other industry classification schemes, for example, the text-based industry classifica-
tion of Hoberg and Phillips (2010) and Hoberg and Phillips (2017), might be superior to
the one employed in CLMX, but typically do not cover the period under consideration.
9However, the regression approach of LPSZ, which is the only part of their analysis
covering the entire CLMX sample, raises some concerns about endogeneity, as we argue in
our Online Appendix, Section B.
10As illustrated in Panel B of Figure 1, the different types of price quotations play a
crucial role in the effect of the bid-ask bounce on IV estimation. The regression-based
approach of LPSZ cannot account for these differences. However, they are essential for
understanding the timing of the IV increase in the pre-decimalization period. They become
especially relevant for the NASDAQ stock universe, for which the IV increased despite flat
or even decreasing spread, which is in contradiction to the pure spread-bias relation studied
by LPSZ.
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measurement. We discuss their effect on the IV in Section 4. Section 5
concludes.
2 Revisiting CLMX
As a starting point, we review the approach of CLMX to decompose
stock returns into three components: a market return, an industry-specific
return, and a firm-specific return. Following their notation, we denote the
excess market return at time t by Rmt , the excess return of industry i by
Ri t , and the excess return of firm j belonging to industry i by R ji t . For the
market return, CLMX assume that the capital asset pricing model holds.
Hence, we can write industry and firm returns as
Ri t = βimRmt + ε̃i t , (1)
R ji t = β jiRi t + η̃ ji t = β jiβimRmt + β ji ε̃i t + η̃ ji t , (2)
where ε̃i t and η̃ ji t denote the industry and firm innovations, and βim and
β ji are the corresponding beta coefficients. To avoid the estimation of
market betas, CLMX follow Campbell et al. (1997, Chapter 4) and use the
“market-adjusted-return model” with the following modified residuals:
εi t = Ri t − Rmt , η ji t = R ji t − Ri t . (3)
By wi t we denote the weight of industry i in the total market and by w ji t















η ji t , (5)
are the variance of the industry and firm-level residuals, respectively. We
refer to the variance of the firm-level residuals interchangeably as the IV. We
follow CLMX and estimate the individual variances σ2η ji t (σ
2
εi t) using the
realized variance, summing the squared daily returns of a firm (industry)
within a given month. For the market model, the terms in Equations (4)
and (5) are defined analogously, to obtain σ2ε̃t and σ
2
η̃t . The estimates
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denote the cross-sectional variations of the betas, which drive the deviations
of the actual average variances from those of the model and from those of
the “market-adjusted” model. The advantage of using the market-adjusted
model is that it avoids the explicit estimation of the market betas.11
To be confident that we have built our analysis on the same subset of
data as CLMX, we revisit their main empirical results. We use stock price
data from CRSP spanning the period from January 1962 to December 2016.
Hence, compared to the study of CLMX, which spans the period from July
1962 to December 1997, our sample period starts six months earlier and
ends nineteen years later. As a consequence, our dataset includes a jump
in the number of firms in July 1962, when Amex stocks were added to the
database. A second spike occurred in December 1972, with the inclusion of
NASDAQ stocks. For our analysis, we include all common stocks listed on
NYSE, Amex, and NASDAQ with share codes 11 and 12.12 As in Campbell
et al. (2001), we follow Fama and French (1997) and aggregate individual
firms into 49 industries according to their SIC classification.
Figure 2 shows the estimates of individual variance components. For
reference, we include the series constructed by CLMX. Visually, the repli-
cation is almost perfect, with the market and firm components of CLMX
11Its use is justified by the small magnitude of the cross-sectional variations of the betas.
In particular, we find that the correlation between the increments of the exact and the
“market-adjusted” computation is 0.89 and 0.97 for industry and firm variances, respectively.
Hence, we find the quality of the approximation to be adequate, especially for the IV, our
main object of interest.
12This restriction is standard, and its impact on the final result is negligible. Moreover,
the notion of IV for funds (e.g., index ETFs) has a very different interpretation from that
for common stocks.
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mostly hidden behind the lines corresponding to our replication of the
components mentioned above. The only significant deviation is in the
industry component in the 1975-1985 period. One possible explanation
of this gap is that we use a more recent SIC grouping version, published
on Kenneth French’s website. However, the gap does not disappear even
when we use the old version of SIC code grouping from Fama and French
(1997). The same applies to other changes in the construction of variance
components we tested, such as exclusions of secondary share classes, or
rebalancing the portfolios daily according to their capitalization instead of
using the initial one. Panel A also confirms the conclusion of more recent
studies (e.g., Bekaert et al. (2012)) that after the CLMX period, the IV
reverted to the levels observed in the 1960s, while industry and market
components appear higher in post-CLMX period than before.
While Figure 2 gives a visual inspection about how well our data
matches the data in CLMX, Table 1 reports the numbers related to our
replication of the CLMX results. The results show that our replication
is accurate, and it confirms the main conclusions of CLMX: Idiosyncratic
volatility exhibits a significant trend. In contrast, for other components
(industry and market), the trend is often insignificant. As in CLMX, we per-
form an additional robustness check and replace the largest value (October
1987) by the second largest in the sample and report the columns labeled
“Downweighted crash”. This additional exercise shows that a single outlier
does not drive the results. In the Online Appendix C (Tables 2 to 4), we
provide additional replication results for the equal-weighted (EW) IV, and
for the IV series based on lower return frequencies. We find the same pat-
terns as CLMX. We confirm that, in their setup, the idiosyncratic volatility
trend is stronger for the EW measure and weaker at lower frequencies.
Nevertheless, compared to the initial results in CLMX, some small nu-
merical deviations remain. For instance, we estimate a trend of 1.03×10−5
for the idiosyncratic volatility, compared to a trend of 0.965×10−5 in CLMX.
These numerical deviations likely stem from a combination of differences
in inputs, i.e., the estimated volatility components, from how we and CLMX
compute the statistics reported in the table, or from numerical instabilities
because the trend is a tiny number. Figure 2 shows that the largest differ-
ence in the trend test input, i.e., the variance component series, is in the
industry component. To investigate whether this input difference is the
cause of numerical differences in trend estimates, we reverse-engineered
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Figure 2: CLMX replication.
Description: CLMX variance decomposition of total variance into idiosyncratic (firm, Panel
A), industry (Panel B), and market (Panel C) components. For reference, we include the
original graph of the times series displayed in Campbell et al. (2001) as background for our
figure. Dot-dashed vertical line, corresponding to December 14, 1972, marks the inclusion
of NASDAQ stocks into the sample. The dashed vertical line denotes the end of the CLMX
sample (December 31, 1997).
Interpretation: The replication of CLMX series is visually almost perfect, with the only
visible deviation in the industry component in 1975-1985. The idiosyncratic volatility















Raw data Downweighted crash
MKT IND FRM MKT IND FRM
Daily, VW (replicated), (N = 426)
Mean × 100 1.56 0.90 6.34 1.43 0.89 6.28
Std. dev. × 100 3.45 0.54 2.75 1.48 0.46 2.28
Std. dev. × 100 detrended 3.44 0.53 2.44 1.47 0.45 1.93
Linear trend ×105 0.20 0.11 1.03 0.12 0.11 1.00
PS-statistic 0.28 0.08 0.88 0.16 0.07 0.83
Confidence interval (0.00, 0.55) (0.03, 0.13) (0.54, 1.21) (-0.08, 0.40) (0.02, 0.12) (0.48, 1.18)
Daily, VW (original), (N = 426)
Mean × 100 1.54 1.03 6.44 1.41 1.03 6.38
Std. dev. × 100 3.50 0.66 2.91 1.47 0.62 2.45
Std. dev. × 100 detrended 3.49 0.66 2.54 1.46 0.62 2.01
Linear trend ×105 0.16 0.06 0.96 0.09 0.06 0.94
PS-statistic 0.26 0.09 1.00 0.14 0.08 0.96
Confidence interval (-0.07, 0.60) (-0.10, 0.27) (0.55, 1.47) (-0.12, 0.41) (-0.10, 0.27) (0.49, 1.42)
Table 1: Replication of main CLMX results.
Description: Replication of Campbell et al. (2001, Table III) on the CLMX sample (July 1962 - December 1997) for value-weighted IV
computed with daily returns. The means and standard deviations are annualized. The standard deviation detrended correspond to a
standard deviation of residuals in a regression of variance component on linear trend. Linear trend statistic is based on OLS of the variance
measure on a linear trend. PS statistic is computed as in Vogelsang (1998); the corresponding implied confidence interval is computed on
90% level. Panel labeled “replicated” shows the values computed by us, panel labeled “original” shows the corresponding numbers as
presented in Campbell et al. (2001). Raw data columns compute the statistics directly from estimates of individual variance components.
For downweighted crash columns, we replace the largest observation by the second largest value over the CLMX (1962-1997) sample.
Interpretation: Our replication is reasonably accurate and confirms the main conclusion of Campbell et al. (2001): Idiosyncratic volatility
trended up in period 1962-1997, while the other components did not.
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the volatility components’ data points from Figures 2 to 4 in CLMX by
converting their original graph to data. By construction, the series we thus
recover is visually indistinguishable from the series of CLMX. Then, we
recomputed the statistics and trend tests with the reverse-engineered data.
Because a portion of the differences in the numerical results from the
reverse-engineered data remains,13 there is likely a difference in which
(some of) the statistics are computed by us and by CLMX. However, because
the Vogelsang PS-statistic is straightforward to implement, we conjecture
that the remaining small differences are due to some numerical issues.
Therefore, we did an additional exercise and simulated a time series with
a trend and volatility similar to the observed volatility time-series. Then,
we added some small noise to the observations such that, visually, the
time series almost look identical. Applying the Vogelsang PS-statistic, we
find that we can observe similar differences in the trend estimates like the
ones we observe between our estimate and the estimate in CLMX. Hence,
although we cannot perfectly replicate the results in CLMX, we believe that
we are sufficiently close.
Before we proceed to a more detailed empirical analysis, we discuss
two useful properties of the CLMX IV measure. First, we can represent the














w ji t Var(R ji t)−
∑
i
wi t Var(Ri t).
(8)
This result requires only that we can classify each element j into its parent
category i, and that we use an identical set of weights for portfolio returns
and for weighting individual variances. Therefore, the same applies to
σ2εt , i.e., the industry component variance in Equation (4), which equals
average industry variance minus the market variance. As a consequence, if
we leave out the industry layer and measure the IV directly relative to the
market, the corresponding IV would equal the sum of firm (idiosyncratic)
and industry components in the market–industry–firm setting of CLMX.
13Although we do not get precisely the same numbers as in CMLX, we obtain non-
significant trends in the market and industry components, and a significant trend in the
IV.
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To provide additional insights into the determinants of the IV, we con-
sider the following simplified example. We assume that at time t, the
industries have an equal number of firms and capital distribution, i.e.,
w ji t ≡ w̄ j t for all i. We denote the capitalization weights of individual
industries by wi t . Further, we assume that for all t, all stocks in industry
i have equal variance Var(R ji t) = σ̄
2
i t
, and that all pairwise correlations























In this simplified setting, we can separate three primary drivers that influ-
ence the IV estimate multiplicatively. The first term is equal to the average
firm variance. The second term equals one minus the within-industry cor-





), is negatively related to average
industry concentration.
The decomposition in Equation (9) provides a very accurate approx-
imation of the exact IV computed by Equation (8). In our sample (1962
to 2016) of 660 monthly observations, the correlation between the exact
IV series and its approximation based on realized moments is 0.9968 and
0.9916 in the VW and EW case.14 The trend estimate of the approximate
VW series over the CLMX sample is 6.8% smaller than that of the exact
series, but it remains strongly significant. In the EW case, the approximate
series’s trend estimate is higher by 3.5% compared to the exact EW IV. Given
these results, we use Equation (9) as guidance for our line of arguments.
We study the contribution of each of the three channels to the CLMX trend
in IV and explore whether these contributions are robust when adjusting
for microstructure biases.
14The high correlation values do not stem purely from short-term fluctuations of the IV.
If we compute the correlation of moving averages of both series over a five-year window,
the correlation is even higher.
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3 The three channels of IV measurement
First, we focus on average variances and correlation, whose measure-
ment will potentially be influenced by the microstructure effects laid out in
the introduction. Then, we analyze market concentration and its impact
on IV.
3.1 Average variances
In Figure 3, we display the time series of the first driver of IV, average
variance, both value weighted and equally weighted (analyzed by Xu and
Malkiel (2003)). The value-weighted variances (Panel A) based on different
frequencies are relatively close to each other, with the most significant gap
in the late 1980s and 1990s, i.e., the end of the CLMX sample. The series
based on monthly frequency highlights the initial period of abnormally
low variance. For the equal-weighted average (Panel B), the gap between
the estimates on different frequencies is substantial. The monthly-return
series has a visible jump on the inclusion of NASDAQ. However, even
after NASDAQ’s inclusion, there seems to be a trend in the equal-weighted
measure, though it is much weaker than the daily-return realized variances
suggest.
As before, we formally test the hypothesis of having no deterministic
trend in average variances for the CLMX sample using Vogelsang (1998).
However, we depart from CLMX and run the trend tests on the logarithm
of the average variances, rather than on their levels. We do so because
Vogelsang computes the critical values in the setting with Gaussian innova-
tions. Hence, they are more accurate for log-series whose increments are
closer to Gaussian. Table 2 presents the results. In the full CLMX sample
(Table 2, Panel A), the point estimates of the trend based on daily-return
realized variance (RV) are above the estimates based on monthly returns
(RVm). However, the evidence against the null of no trend is weaker, due
to the increased standard errors for daily-return RV stemming from the
persistence of the series. On the shorter sample that starts with the inclu-
sion of NASDAQ stocks, no evidence of a trend in value-weighted variance
for the monthly frequency emerges. The equal-weighted series based on
monthly returns has a significant trend, though its magnitude is less than
half of the one found on the daily frequency.
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Figure 3: EW and VW variances.
Description: Comparison of equal-weighted and value-weighted variances in log scale.
The series correspond to a 12-month moving average. Panel A: Value-weighted average of
realized variances. Panel B: Equal-weighted average of realized variances. Shaded areas
correspond to NBER recessions. Dot-dashed vertical line, corresponding to December 14,
1972, marks the inclusion of NASDAQ stocks into the sample. The dashed vertical line
denotes the end of the CLMX sample (December 31, 1997).
Interpretation: Average realized variances of stocks are higher at higher frequencies, more
so when weighted equally.
Trend and Reversal of Idiosyncratic Volatility Revisited 17
Full NASDAQ Low Price
VW EW VW EW VW EW



















































































⋆ , ⋆⋆ , and ⋆⋆⋆ denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 2: Trend tests of average variance series.
Description: Vogelsang PS1− t test of average variance series. All values are multiplied by
1, 000. We indicate whether the individual variances are weighted equally (EW) or by their
capitalization (VW). The Full series contains all stocks that have a minimum of ten daily
observations in given month. NASDAQ columns consider only a subset of stocks listed on
NASDAQ. Low Price columns are based on stocks with price no greater than 10$. RV and
RVm are the realized variances based on one month of daily and monthly returns, where
the latter uses a single observation. Hasbrouck and Roll series correspond to the MCMC
(Hasbrouck, 2009) and moment estimators of the model of Roll, 1984. Smoothed series is
the outcome of the filtering procedure for the model described in Section 3.1.2.
Interpretation: There is a significant trend in the average variance over 1962-1997 period.
The evidence of a trend is much weaker when we account for bid-ask bounce and price
discreteness.
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3.1.1 Adjusting for the bid-ask bounce using Roll (1984)
We can link the difference between realized variances in Figure 3 to
the sample autocorrelation in daily stock returns. Indeed, we find that
the average daily autocorrelation becomes strongly negative from the mid-
1980s till the end of the CLMX sample. This observation is consistent with
the bid-ask bounce model of Roll (1984). In this model, the efficient log-
price process (s∗t ) is assumed to follow a random walk, and the observed log-
price (s) corresponds to the bid or the ask with equal probability. Formally,
st =
¨
s∗t + c, prob = 0.5,
s∗t − c, prob = 0.5,
with s∗t = s
∗
t−1 +σεt . (10)
Under these assumptions, the sample variance is biased upward, and the
first-order return autocovariance equals −c2 (higher orders equal zero).
To correct for the bias in estimates of the sample variance, we use the
model-implied relation
Var(rt) + 2 Cov(rt , rt−1) = σ
2. (11)
A common approach to estimate the underlying variance σ2 is to plug
sample moments into the left-hand side of Equation (11). One caveat is
that due to finite-sample variation, the resulting variance estimate might
be negative, even if the model is correctly specified. As a crude way to




 ÓVar(rt) + 2dCov(rt , rt−1), 0

. (12)
We also estimate Roll’s model by means of the Gibbs sampler as proposed
by Hasbrouck (2009), which ensures positive estimates of variance. We
use both methods to obtain monthly estimates of return volatilities for all
stocks in the universe.15
15Corwin and Schultz (2012) develop another estimator of the volatility and the spread
which uses daily high and low prices, instead of autocorrelations. However, we do not
consider this approach here, because the CRSP database does not contain high and low
prices for all stocks in all periods. Moreover, as argued in the Online Appendix, the estimator
of Corwin and Schultz (2012) may introduce a nontrivial bias.
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3.1.2 Adjusting for additional microstructure biases
Even though Roll’s model generates bid-ask bounce, it implies that
observed quotes vary smoothly with the efficient price, so it does not gen-
erate flat price segments. In addition, there are other microstructure and
data-related issues with daily CRSP returns. First, price discreteness may
affect the estimates of the variance, as illustrated in Figure 1. Indeed, Bali
et al. (2008) find that the trend in the IV, which was detected over a period
of minimum tick size of USD 1/8, was concentrated among NASDAQ stocks
with low price. Because these stocks are the ones most affected by price dis-
creteness, it is critical to understand its role in the measurement of volatility.
A second concern is that both volatility and bid-ask spreads vary over time.
Bid-ask spread often oscillates on a day-to-day basis. Thus, holding it fixed
over the given month is inadequate. Our third concern is related to the fact
that prices in the CRSP database have been recorded in two different ways:
as the quote midpoint or as the closing price. Furthermore, the quotes
can correspond to either closing quotes or inside quotes, depending on the
exchange and period under consideration.16 For a consistent comparison
of stock variances across time and exchanges, it is therefore essential to
accommodate these differences.
To take into account the aforementioned microstructure effects and
features of the data, we introduce the following price model. We denote
the true, efficient log-price by s∗ and use capital letters for level variables.
Then, we assume that the efficient (log-) bid b and ask a are symmetric
around the efficient log-price, that is,
a∗t = s
∗




t − Ct , (13)
where Ct > 0 denotes (one-half of) the time-varying bid-ask spread. Next,
we assume that the observed quotes are a rounded version of their efficient
counterparts, with bid rounded down and ask rounded up. If available, we
use quotes instead of the recorded closing price. If they are unavailable, as
is the case for NYSE stocks before 1992, we use the closing price for the
estimation, and assume that it equals the bid and ask with equal probability.
16Section A of the Online Appendix summarizes these features in more detail and
discusses their potential effect on the measurement of variance.















dt , prob = 0.5,
(14)
where dt is the effective tick size (e.g., USD 1/8) prevailing in period t. To
complete the model, we specify the transition probabilities as
log(S∗t+1Ft+1 + X t+1) = s
∗
t +σt+1εs,t+1, (15)
log(σt+1) = log(σ̄) +ϕσ(log(σt)− log(σ̄)) + γσεσ,t+1, (16)
ct+1 = χt+1 + γcεc,t+1, (17)
χt+1 = χ̄ +ϕχ(χt − χ̄) + γχεχ ,t+1, (18)
with iid Gaussian innovation terms ε·,t , independent of each other. By X t ,
we denote the dividend in period t, and by Ft , we mean the adjustment
factor reflecting events such as stock splits. The structure of the spread is
motivated by the typical evolution of a spread, characterized by a slowly
varying mean and a noise component. We estimate the states through
particle filtering.17 Although we impose independence of innovations in
the transition densities of spread and volatility and estimate each stocks’
states separately, the posterior means of those variables can be correlated,
both over time and across assets. Consistent with the model of Bollen et al.
(2004), the smoothed volatility estimates, which are clear of bid-ask bounce
effects, are positively correlated with the spread in the cross-section of
stocks. Moreover, the spread is positively related to the difference between
the realized variance and the smoothed estimates, which we can interpret
as a measure of bias in the realized variance. However, this relation holds
only on subsets where trading prices are available.
3.1.3 Is the trend in average variance robust?
Figure 4 compares the estimates of average variance using different
estimation methods.18 For the equal-weighted average, all the robust mea-
sures of average variance lie below the sample estimate based on daily
17For the complete data treatment and details of the filtering procedure, we refer to
Appendix C.
18The measures of Roll, Hasbrouck, and the smoothed estimates all correspond to the
variance of monthly log-returns, while the CLMX measure is based on simple returns.
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returns, with the largest difference in the period from 1985 to 2000. These
differences largely disappeared with the quote decimalization in 2001.
Both estimates of Roll’s model are rather close to squared monthly returns.
The smoothed estimates are even lower. One possible explanation of the
difference is that the smoothed series takes into account price discrete-
ness and spread volatility, which are not entirely eliminated when using a
monthly frequency. Another possibility is that the difference stems from
the fact that our filtering procedure eliminates the outliers. Yet another
possible explanation is that part of the difference may stem from our use of
quotes rather than closing prices, combined with the fact that some closing
prices fall outside of the bid-ask range. In Figure C1 of the appendix, we
show that most of the observations flagged as outliers occur after 1995,
so the elimination of outliers is unlikely to be the main driving force of
the gap. The explanation based on using quotes instead of closing prices
seems unlikely due to the following observation. Figure 4 shows that the
gap is present even in 1972-1982 period, when NYSE stocks’ quotes and
NASDAQ stocks’ closing prices are unavailable, so the data used by different
methods are identical. Combined with the fact that the gap closes in period
1997-2001 when the exchanges undergone multiple tick-size reductions,
indicates that price discreteness is the most likely source. We leave an in-
depth investigation of its source for future research. For the value-weighted
IV, the differences are quantitatively smaller, because it puts lower weight
on small stocks, which are more heavily affected by microstructure effects.
The results of Vogelsang’s trend test, reported in the left column of
Table 2, are broadly consistent with the observed patterns: point estimates
for the robust measures are in the majority of cases below the realized
variance estimated from daily data. Still, they result in a rejection of the
no-trend hypothesis in most cases. In Figure 3, we see that the volatility
The correspondence between the variance of a random variable and its (nonlinear) trans-
form is, in general, not trivial. With conditionally Gaussian log-returns with zero mean,
the corresponding variance of simple returns (i.e., log-normal random variables) can be




− 1), where σ2 denotes the variance of log-returns. We
used the Gaussian case as an approximation for the variance of simple returns. Using the
simple return variance approximation does not alter our results substantially, as long as
we bound the monthly variance of log-returns by a (large) constant, for example, by unity.
Without such a bound, some extreme variances of log-returns blow up the estimates due to
exponentiation. These extreme values often represent a data error (see, Online Appendix,
Section B), or occur for penny stocks.
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Figure 4: Average variance: Comparison of estimation methods.
Description: Equally weighted (Panel A) and value-weighted (Panel B) average variance,
while RV and RVm are the realized variance measures of daily returns and the squared
monthly return. The Roll series is the sample moment estimate of the model of Roll
(1984). “Hasbrouck” denotes the Gibbs-sampler estimate of Roll’s model proposed by
Hasbrouck (2009). The smoothed series is obtained from the model described in Section
3.1.2. The values are shown in log scale, smoothed by a moving average filter with a
window of 12 months. Shaded areas correspond to NBER recessions. Dot-dashed vertical
line, corresponding to December 14, 1972, marks the inclusion of NASDAQ stocks into
the sample. The dashed vertical line denotes the end of the CLMX sample (December 31,
1997).
Interpretation: When we account for microstructure biases, the average variance is lower
and with a weaker or even no trend.
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is abnormally low at the very beginning of the sample period, which can
drive the trend tests. To verify this observation, we repeat the battery of
trend tests on the CLMX sample, truncated to December 1972 (inclusion
of NASDAQ) from the beginning. In this restricted period (Panel B), we
see that the equal-weighted daily-return RV has an even stronger trend
than in the full CLMX sample, and the gap between the baseline and robust
measures becomes immense. The confidence interval for the trend estimate
for the smoothed variance series contains zero.
Because Bali et al. (2008) find that the trend observed in the CLMX
period is concentrated among low-price stocks and NASDAQ, we investigate
to what extent the trend in average variance is robust for those subgroups.
The results in Table 2 suggest that, while the sample variance shows strong
evidence of a trend, the evidence becomes weaker when we adjust for
microstructure biases. For the smoothed estimates, the absence of a trend
cannot be rejected, except for the equal-weighted measure for stocks with a
low price. Hence, our result that the trend in average variances disappears
remains valid on the NASDAQ subsample.
3.2 Correlation
For our second channel driving IV, average correlation, we observe from
Equation (8) that IV is negatively related to industry variances, which are
positively associated with individual stocks’ variances and within-industry
correlations. Hence, average correlation is negatively related to IV. We
start our empirical analysis of correlations by estimating their average
across all pairs of stocks in our sample. We compute both equal- and
value-weighted averages. Every month, we calculate the correlation based
on one year of data and use only stocks with a full year of observations,
eliminating any stocks listed or delisted during the year, or that have any
missing observations. We estimate the correlations using daily, weekly, and
monthly returns.
Panels A and C of Figure 5 confirm the observation of CLMX for their
time period. The correlations based on a higher (daily) frequency are much
lower than those obtained from monthly data. This observation holds
for the entire CLMX sample, both for the value-weighted (Panel A) and
equal-weighted (Panel C) cases. Because we use an identical set of firms
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Figure 5: Average correlations.
Description: Correlations between all pairs of stocks, computed using one year of data at
daily, weekly and monthly frequencies. In Panel A, we plot the value-weighted average
correlation. In Panel B, we plot the corrected value-weighted correlations with wi j∝ Vi Vj .
In Panels C and D, we plot the corresponding equal-weighted correlations. Shaded areas
correspond to NBER recessions. Dot-dashed vertical line, corresponding to December 14,
1972, marks the inclusion of NASDAQ stocks into the sample. The dashed vertical line
denotes the end of the CLMX sample (December 31, 1997).
Interpretation: Average sample correlation is higher at lower frequencies in the CLMX
sample. Asynchronicity correction based on frequency of non-trades (zero returns) provides
a reasonable approximation of the bias.
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for all frequencies, the only reason for these differences must stem from
the negative (cross-) autocorrelations of daily returns in the CLMX sample.
Interestingly, the wedge between the correlations calculated at different
frequencies disappears in the post-CLMX period.
These observations seem difficult to justify on the grounds of changing
fundamental factors. We argue that at least three microstructure effects
may cause severe correlation biases. First, an asynchronicity bias arises
because the computation of the sample covariance requires pairs of returns
covering the same period, while in practice, trades of different assets occur
at different times. A simple treatment is to “synchronize” the prices to
a fixed grid by using the last known price value. This procedure biases
the sample correlation towards zero.19 In the extreme case, when no
trade occurs between two adjacent sampling points, the price is flat (zero
return), and the resulting contribution to the sample covariance is zero.
Second, price discreteness has a similar effect and, when the tick size
is large compared to the price of the stock, produces flat prices. Third,
microstructure noise due to the bid-ask bounce inflates the variance of
the individual stocks but keeps the covariances intact as long as the noise
is independent across assets. In turn, the correlations are again biased
towards zero.
For simplicity, we label all zero-return observations as “non-trades,”
even though zero returns may also occur for nonzero trading volumes.
For stocks with zero trading volume, as well as for those with unavailable
trading prices, CRSP records a closing-quote midpoint. The latter applies to
all NASDAQ stocks before November 1, 1982, and for NASDAQ SmallCap
Market before June 15, 1992. Quote midpoints remain flat unless the bid
or ask (inside or closing) quote is revised or filled. Filling is less likely for
illiquid stocks with wide bid-ask spreads.
Price discreteness further widens the spread,20 causing more frequent
non-trades. It also generates non-trades for closing prices, because the
round-off to the nearest tick makes the probability of a zero return positive,
even if the underlying distribution of returns has continuous support. For
NASDAQ stocks, Christie and Schultz (1994) show that when the tick size
19The phenomenon of decreasing return correlations with increasing frequency is com-
monly referred to as the Epps effect. See Epps (1979).
20See Hasbrouck (1999), Zhang et al. (2008), and Bessembinder (2000).
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was USD 1/8, NASDAQ dealers avoided quotes ending with odd eighths,
amplifying price discreteness.21 The bid-ask bounce has the opposite effect
on the frequency of non-trades because the trading prices would move
even if the efficient price were constant.
To gauge the potential magnitude of the correlation bias, we compute
the percentage of non-trades over time. The equal-weighted percentage of
non-trades peaked around 50% right after the inclusion of NASDAQ and
started to decrease with tick-size reductions, beginning in 1992 with Amex
and ending with the decimalization on all exchanges in 2001.22 Comparing
with the value-weighted share, we find that non-trades are concentrated
among smaller stocks. For the entire CMLX period, the average equal-
weighted and value-weighted monthly shares of zero trades are around
32% and 13%, respectively. After the introduction of decimalization in
2001, these numbers drop to 4% and 1%. Because each non-trade affects
all sample correlations with a given stock, the share of non-trades may
have a significant impact on portfolio variances, as all return cross-products
vanish.
To obtain a better estimate of the asynchronicity bias, we consider the
following simplified setup. We assume that non-trades for asset i occur
with probability λi , independently of the time and other assets’ non-trades
and returns. Then, we define the bias correction term Bi j as
ρ̂i j := ρi jBi j(λi ,λ j)≈ ρi jBi(λi)B j(λ j). (19)
Hence, we can interpret 1− Bi j as the percentage bias in the sample corre-
lation. To facilitate efficient computation of the bias in large portfolios, it
is useful to approximate the bias correction by Bi j(λi ,λ j)≈ Bi(λi)B j(λ j),
separating the effect of individual non-trades. A naive estimate of Bi j
corresponds to
BNi j ≈ (1−λi)(1−λ j), (20)
which is the expected percentage of return cross-products affected by a
non-trade. The naive correction works adequately for moderate shares of
21In the Online Appendix, Section A, we show that odd-eighth avoidance is valid over
the entire period before quote “decimalization”.
22The equal-weighted series is computed as the proportion cross-firm average percentage
of non-trades within a month. For the value-weighted series, we attach a weight to each
firm’s non-trade share according to its market capitalization.
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non-trades but deteriorates for large ones, for which BN is biased upward.
A better approximation can be obtained by simulation. We sample a bi-
variate random walk for a price process and generate iid non-trades with
different probabilities λ. Then, we estimate the sample correlations based
on observations contaminated by non-trades. Finally, we regress log(ρ̂/ρ)
on log(1−λi) + log(1−λ j), which yields an estimate of 0.8. Thus, we use
Bi = (1−λi)
4/5.
In what follows, we consider the variances and non-trade probabilities
λ to be known.23 In our implementation, we replace them with their
sample estimates. In the first step, we compute the average bias in the
pairwise correlations 1− B̄w (with weights w), where we define B̄w as
B̄w =
∑N
i 6= j wiw jBi j∑N
i 6= j wiw j
. (21)
The average percentage bias in the correlations (1− B̄), using the naive
bias estimates, goes up to 75% in the equal-weighted case and 30% in the
value-weighted case at the time when the non-trade shares are peaking.
Because the variance of a diversified portfolio is dominated by the average
covariance of its constituents, we can view the average bias in the sample
correlation as a crude estimate of the percentage bias in the sample variance.
However, such an estimate neglects the cross-sectional correlation between
the bias Bi j and the weight in the portfolio variance wiw jσ̂i j . For a more
accurate approximation, we apply the bias correction in Equation (19)
directly to the individual correlations, and compute their average via
ρ̄C(w) =
∑
i 6= j wiw jρi j∑




wi w j ρ̂i j
Bi B j∑





















where we use “ ˆ ” to denote the sample moments.24 Analogously, we
23An additive microstructure noise, which is independent of the returns and the asset,
would not affect estimates of the covariance, but will still bias upward the variances in the
denominator of the correlation. Therefore, the correlation estimates will remain biased
toward zero, and our bias correction can be deemed conservative.
24We exclude stocks with zero sample variance, for which the sample correlation is
ill-defined.
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In Figure 5, Panels C and D, we present the average correlations cor-
rected for the asynchronicity bias as defined in Equation (22). The bias-
corrected average correlations in the recent period are rather close to the
levels observed in the 1970s and early 1980s. This observation holds even
for the equal-weighted average, which is not the case for the uncorrected
estimates. The only period of lower correlations surrounds the dot-com
bubble. Also, the bias-corrected estimates are similar to the estimates based
on monthly returns, where the effects of the microstructure are less signif-
icant, which generates confidence in the bias correction procedure. Part
of the difference between the bias-corrected estimates based on different
frequencies can be caused by effects of the microstructure not reflected in
non-trades, for example, the bid-ask bounce and price discreteness. The
transitory drop in correlations based on monthly data could also be partially
driven by residual microstructure effects for highly illiquid stocks. In the
full sample, where we do not exclude stocks without a full year of data,
the bias correction is probably stronger, because the excluded stocks have
a higher non-trade frequency on average.
As the above analysis indicates, the realized correlations based on
daily CRSP return data are biased towards zero in the early part of the
sample, but the biases vanish with quote decimalization. These biases
reconcile the differences between average correlations based on different
sampling frequencies, as observed by CLMX in their Figure 5. Once we
correct for the asynchronicity bias in correlation, the long-term mean of
correlations stabilizes. Therefore, the break in correlation biases associated
with decimalization contributes to the reversal of the IV, even more so for
the equal-weighted measure.26
25In principle, the corrected estimates can violate positive semidefiniteness of the
covariance matrix, leading to an infeasible correlation or negative variance estimates.
However, this issue does not occur in our application, so we decide to disregard it.
26Because the realized correlations are at their historical low in the 1990s and are
negatively related to the IV, they represent another omitted variable in the regression
approach of LPSZ. As a consequence, they overstate the role of the bid-ask bounce at the
expense of other biases in correlations.
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3.3 Market concentration
Theoretically, Equation (9) connotes a negative impact of market con-
centration on measured IVs. Intuitively, this impact stems from a stronger
diversification effect in industry variances, driving the IV up. We consider






with w j = wiw ji denoting the capitalization-based weight of firm j in the









with wi denoting the weight of industry i and w ji the weight of firm j
in industry i. The former is more appropriate if we want to measure the
diversification effect in the market portfolio, which affects market variance
and also industry-layer variance. The latter is more suitable for studying an
average diversification effect in industry portfolios, whose variance drives
the industry-layer variance and the IV.
In Figure 6, we plot the value-weighted and equal-weighted concentra-
tion indices. In Panel A, the period of the increase in value-weighted IV as
perceived by CLMX coincides with a period of decreasing market and in-
dustry concentration. The concentration stabilizes in the post-CLMX period
when the IV in Figure 2 tends to decline again. A similar pattern emerges
when we assign equal weights to the firms. In Panel B, the decrease in the
concentration based on equal weights is negatively related to the number
of listed firms in the market and industries. Indeed, in the CLMX period, we
witness a substantial increase in the number of listed firms and a decrease
afterward.27
In the simplified setting of Equation (9), the expected squared IV de-
pends multiplicatively on the industry concentration via 1− H̄ . For the
27Doidge et al. (2017) provide an excellent discussion of the causes for the changing
trend in the number of listed firms, highlighting a decreased propensity to be listed, partially
explained by regulatory changes and developments in financial markets.
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Figure 6: Market concentration time series.
Description: Panel A shows the time series of value-weighted market concentration mea-
sured by the Herfindahl–Hirschman index (H ), defined in Equation (24), and a weighted
average of industry concentrations (H̄ ), defined in Equation (25). Panel B shows the




F is the number of firms in a given period. All values are computed at the beginning of
the month. The sample spans the period from January 1962 to December 2016. Shaded
areas correspond to NBER recessions. Dot-dashed vertical line, corresponding to December
14, 1972, marks the inclusion of NASDAQ stocks into the sample. The dashed vertical line
denotes the end of the CLMX sample (December 31, 1997).
Interpretation: Equity market concentration decreased over the CLMX sample and thus
contributes to the upward trend in the IV.
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value-weighted IV in the CLMX period, 1− H̄ increased by approximately
17.8% peak-to-trough. At the same time, IV based on realized variances
roughly doubled. Hence, industry concentration plays only a secondary role
in microstructure biases. However, the size of its effect remains economi-
cally significant.28 The effect of industry concentration on equal-weighted
IV is negligible because equal weights minimize Herfindahl–Hirschman
index.
4 Was there a trend in the IV?
Studying the different channels driving the IV in the previous section, we
have learned the following. First, the increase in average realized variance
from 1962 to 1997 is, to no small extent, an artifact of the bid-ask bounce,
further amplified by price discreteness. Second, these effects, combined
with price asynchronicity, bias the sample (realized) correlations towards
zero. Third, after the quote decimalization in 2001, these microstructure
effects in daily returns become negligible. Hence, average variances and
correlations calculated with different sampling frequencies converge. Lastly,
the decrease in industry concentration over the period covered by CLMX
explains, at most, only a part of the trend in the IV.
To finalize our analysis of a potential trend in IV during the CLMX
period, we now correct for the biases in the estimates of the variance and
correlation.29 Before presenting the test statistics, Figure 7 visualizes the
differences of the bias-corrected IV and baseline IV series in Equation (9).
The value-weighted baseline IV is trending in the CLMX sample and reverts
afterward. Both patterns are (visually) weaker for the Gibbs estimate of
28Clearly, without controlling for industry correlation, the explanation of the IV trend is
incomplete. Hence, as we argue in the Online Appendix, Section B, the argument of LPSZ
that the bid-ask bounce alone explains the trend in value-weighted IV does not appear to
be pertinent due to an omitted variable bias in their regression tests, hence overstating the
role of the bid-ask bounce.
29To obtain an indication of the impact of microstructure effects on the measurement of
the IV, we also analyzed IV estimates based on different sampling frequencies. The results
were in line with the microstructure bias rationale, i.e., the IV based on a lower frequency,
which is (more) robust to asynchronicity and bid-ask bounce effects, falls below the series
obtained using higher frequencies. This pattern holds particularly in periods with strong
microstructure effects. These results can be obtained from the authors.
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Figure 7: Original and bias-corrected estimates of the IV.
Description: Comparison of the original estimates of the IV, the robust IV estimates follow-
ing Hasbrouck (2009), and our IV estimate using the robust variance measures defined
in Section 3.1 and adjusting the correlation for asynchronicity bias via Equation (22). In
Panel A, we plot the value-weighted IV and in Panel B the equal-weighted IV. Dot-dashed
vertical line, corresponding to December 14, 1972, marks the inclusion of NASDAQ stocks
into the sample. The dashed vertical line denotes the end of the CLMX sample (December
31, 1997).
Interpretation: Once we account for bid-ask bounce and asynchronicity, the trend in IV is
weaker and the reversal is essentially gone.
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Roll’s model as proposed by Hasbrouck (2009), and virtually non-existent
for the smoothed estimates described in Section 3.1. In the equal-weighted
case, the ordering of the estimates is similar. Here, the smoothed estimates
still show signs of an upward trend before 1997, though its magnitude is
much weaker than in the baseline case.
Table 3 shows the tests of the hypothesis of no trend for the full CLMX
sample and its subset starting in 1972. In the full sample, the magnitudes
of the trend are comparable, due to the low values of the robust variances
at the start of the sample. In the restricted sample, the estimates of the
magnitude of trend drop by 20% to 40% for the value-weighted measures,
and by 25% to 60% for the equal-weighted averages. The estimates for
IV based on smoothed variances are visibly increasing towards the end of
the CLMX period, which falls in the buildup of the dot-com bubble. We
have shown that, when considering each exchange separately, the robust
measures of average variance show little evidence of a trend, but the
average variance of NASDAQ is shifted upward. Furthermore, during the
period covered by CLMX, NASDAQ’s proportion of all exchange-listed stocks
in the sample increased markedly, while its share of capitalization grew at
a rather slow pace. As a consequence, the growth in the equal-weighted
average variance corresponds to the increasing prominence of NASDAQ
stocks in our universe of stocks.
When we restrict our attention to the period after the inclusion of
NASDAQ, namely, from 1972 to 1997, we find that the trend for the value-
weighted IV becomes statistically insignificant, also when using the method
of CLMX. Hence, the strength of evidence of a trend in IV is sensitive to
the inclusion of first few years in the sample. Lastly, in the right columns
of Table 3 we show the test results for series net of industry concentration
effects, computed as IV/(1− H̄ ). Once the industry concentration effects
are turned off, the value-weighted trend estimates are even weaker. The













The trend tests for the IV share show that the absence of trend in it cannot
be rejected in the baseline case of the CLMX approach. Therefore, the
interpretation of the CLMX results as an evidence of an increasing promi-
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nence of the (VW) idiosyncratic component relative to systemic ones is
not justified. The hypothesis is rejected for the EW IV share, due to the
decrease in correlations at the end of the CLMX sample when the number
of listed companies peaked.
Overall, the evidence of a trend in the IV series and its reversal is
limited. The primary driver of the trend is the bias in variance due to
bid-ask bounce effects, which materialized with the increasing availability
of closing prices for NASDAQ stocks in the CRSP database in the 1980s and
1990s, and became negligible after quote decimalization, which reduced the
size of effective spreads and the bias itself. In contrast to the conclusions
of LPSZ for the value-weighted IV, we stress that the bid-ask bounce is
not the only driving force. The decimalization also eliminated biases in
correlation estimates due to price discreteness and asynchronicity. These
biased correlation estimates, in turn, bias the IV estimates upwards. Third,
changes in industry concentration account for approximately 18% of the
trend in idiosyncratic variance in the value-weighted case. We also show
that equal-weighted IV retains a weak trend due to the increasing proportion
of the more volatile NASDAQ stocks.
5 Conclusion
In this study, we revisit the question of the existence of an increase in the
IV in the period from 1962 to 2000, perceived as a trend in earlier studies,
and discuss its primary drivers. We separately study three channels driving
the IV: average variance, average within-industry correlation, and industry
concentration. We show that before the quote decimalization in 2001,
the estimates of the realized variance based on daily returns are severely
biased upward. We identify the bid-ask bounce and price discreteness
as the leading causes. These microstructure effects are the strongest for
NASDAQ stocks with a low price, which Bali et al. (2008) show drove the
increase in the IV. Because in the 1980s and 1990s, these stocks grew in
numbers, and also their trading prices (prone to bid-ask bounce) became
increasingly available, the severity of the biases increased over time, until
they were wiped out by tick-size reductions.
To deal with microstructure biases, we design a model that deals ex-
plicitly with the price discreteness, bid-ask bounce, and other features
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Original Net of IC IV Share
VW EW VW EW VW EW
























































⋆ , ⋆⋆ , and ⋆⋆⋆ denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 3: Trend tests of micsorstructure-adjusted idiosyncratic volatility.
Description: Vogelsang PS1− t test of idiosyncratic volatility series corrected for microstruc-
ture biases. All values are multiplied by 1, 000. We indicate whether the individual variances
are weighted equally (EW) or by their capitalization (VW). Original refers to the estimates
of CLMX based on sample moments and daily returns. Hasbrouck and Smoothed series
use the approximation of the IV series in Equation (9), and the bias-corrected average
correlations defined in (22). Hasbrouck series then applies the MCMC estimates of the
Roll’s model proposed by Hasbrouck (2009). Smoothed series is the outcome of the filtering
procedure for the model described in Section 3.1. Panel labeled Original presents results
for the log-IV, in Net of IC we present results for the IV scaled by (1 − H̄ ), i.e., net of
industry concentration effects as implied by Equation (9). IV Share denotes the ratio of
Idiosyncratic Variance to Total (Average) Variance, where Total Variance equals the sum of
idiosyncratic, industry and market components.
Interpretation: Once we correct for microstructure biases, the evidence in favor of a trend
in idiosyncratic volatility is weaker and sensitive to inclusion of the first few years in the
sample (before NASDAQ).
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contained in the CRSP data. When we replace realized variances with
variances from our model that are robust to microstructure effects, the
trend estimate for average variance decreases by 10% and 39% in the value-
weighted and equal-weighted case, respectively. The effect is substantially
stronger when we restrict the sample 1972-1997, i.e., since NASDAQ joined
the CRSP database till the end of the CLMX sample, with trend estimates
lower by 92% in the value-weighted case and by 75% in the equal-weighted
case. A similar pattern holds for NASDAQ, and low-price subsamples, which
Bali et al., 2008 show to drive the trend in the IV: There is virtually no
decrease on the full CLMX sample for the VW average variance. For the
EW average, the decrease corresponds to 32% of the CLMX estimate. On
the shorter sample of 1972-1997, the trend estimates for both subsamples
(NASDAQ, low-price) and weighting schemes (VW, EW) shrink by at least
65%.
Sample correlations based on daily returns are also biased before quote
decimalization due to the effects of asynchronicity, price discreteness, and
the bid-ask bounce. We confirm the finding of CLMX that equal-weighted
correlations estimated using a lower frequency are much higher than those
based on daily data. The magnitude of the bias is closely related to the
share of zero returns in the sample, which is one of the symptoms of
microstructure effects. The decrease in industry concentration from 1962
to 2000 also contributes to a higher (CLMX measure of) IV due to the
stronger diversification of industry and market portfolios. Still, its effect is
quantitatively small compared to other channels.
Correcting for the bias in variances and correlations, the IV trend esti-
mates for the CLMX sample (1962-1997) decreases by 17% for the value-
weighted and by 34% for the equal-weighted IV. On the shorter sample
starting in 1972 (with the inclusion of NASDAQ), the microstructure effects
constitute 44% (VW case) and 62% (EW case) of the trend estimates. The
most striking feature is the abnormally low IV at the beginning of the
sample period. Lastly, with our microstructure bias adjustments, the IV
series’ trend reversal after 1997 is no longer visible.
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Appendix
A Derivation of Equation (8)
In the derivation we suppress the time subscripts for brevity. We first














w ji(Var(R ji) + Var(Ri)− 2 Cov(R ji , Ri)). (A2)































Plugging in the above in Equation (A2) gives the desired result.
B Derivation of Equation (9)
In the derivation we suppress the time subscripts for brevity. Equation
(8) shows that we need to only compute average firm and industry variances.
Let w̄ denote the vector of weights within an industry. Direct computation




















































Combining the average variance of firms and industries verifies Equation
(9).
C Filtering procedure
To estimate our nonlinear state-space model outlined in Equations (13)
to (18), we implement a particle filter.30 We distinguish three cases: when
only closing prices are available (CP), when bid and ask quotes are available
(BA), and when price information is unavailable (NA). The state vector f
is four-dimensional, f = {s∗, log(σ), c,χ}. We first sample log(σ0) from a
standard Gaussian distribution with a mean equal to a logarithm of Roll’s es-
timate based on the first 22 return observation as measured by CRSP return
series. We bound Roll’s standard deviation by 0.001 from below. For χ0, we
use a Gaussian distribution with standard deviation of 0.2. We set the mean
to log(log(A1/B1)/4) in the BA case. In the CP case, we use the log-spread
implied by the model of Roll, equal to log(
p
−Cov(rt , rt−1)), and estimate
the autocorrelation based on the first 22 returns. In case the autocorrelation
is non-negative, we use log(log(min {(S1 + d1)/(S1 − d1), 5})/4) instead.
We draw s∗0 from a Gaussian distribution with standard deviation equal to
2eχ0 , centered either around the log of the price on the first day (CP), or
around the average of the log-bid and log-ask (BA).
30We refer a reader unfamiliar with particle filtering to the introductory material of
Doucet and Johansen (2011).
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We denote observations at time t by Yt , which consists either of the
bid-ask pair or the closing price. The filtering procedure sequentially
approximates p( f1:t |Y1:t)∝ p(Yt | ft)p( ft | ft−1)p( f1:t−1|Y1:t−1) by a distri-
bution over a discrete set of particles. The transition densities are specified
by Equations (15) to (18), and p( f1:t−1|Y1:t−1) is approximated in the pre-
vious step of the filter. In the BA case, when Yt consists of the observed bid
and ask quote Bt and At , Equation (14) implies




Therefore, the observation equation only imposes constraints on the price-
spread pair (rectangular for {s∗, C}). Because c = log(C) as well as
log(S∗F + X ) are Gaussian, conditionally on current volatility and pre-
vious states, the target distribution is bivariate Gaussian constrained to a
set with nonlinear boundaries. Due to these restrictions, it is desirable to
avoid sampling outside of the feasible set of state values. Next, we denote
the normal distribution truncated to the interval [l, u] by tN(µ,σ2, l, u)
and by tN(µ,σ2, I) when truncated to the set I . Further denoting the i-th
particle by the superscript (i), we sample the states as follows to ensure
that the draws are within the desired region.
1. We draw log-volatilities from the Gaussian transition equation (16).







χ , kl , ku). The bounds of the
truncation region are equal to
kl = log(max((log(At − dt)− log(Bt + dt))/2,0)), (C11)
ku = log((log(At)− log(Bt))/2). (C12)
3. Conditional on draws σ(i) and c
(i)
t , we sample log(S




, (σ2)(i), jl , ju), with









t + log(Bt + dt)), (C14)
jl = log(exp( j̃l)Ft + X t), (C15)
ju = log(exp( j̃u)Ft + X t). (C16)
The j̃’s correspond to bounds on the log-price, the j’s account for
dividend payments.
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4. Conditional on c
(i)
t , we sample χ
(i)
t from N(µχ ,σ
2
χ), where
















In the CP case, we observe only the closing price, which can be either of ask,
so that s∗t + Ct ∈ [St − dt , St], or bid which implies s
∗
t − Ct ∈ [St , St + dt].
Thus,





For the CP case, the following sampling scheme guarantees that we draw
in the feasible region.
1. We draw log-volatilities from the Gaussian transition equation (16).




t } from their transition equations (17)-(18).
3. Conditional on draws σ(i) and c
(i)
t , we sample log(S
∗





,σ2(i), It). The truncation region is a union of two intervals,
It = [ml , mu]∪ [nl , nu], corresponding to the bid and ask cases. The
interval boundaries for the log-price are defined as
m̃l = log(St) + Ct , m̃u = log(St + dt) + Ct , (C20)
ñl = log(St − dt)− Ct , ñu = log(St)− Ct , (C21)
and the boundaries for log(S∗t Ft + X t)
(i) are obtained analogously to
Equation (C15).
When an observation is missing (NA), we directly sample from the transition
equations, with zero incremental weights. After each step, we resample
the particles if the effective (relative) sample size drops below one half. 31
31We use binomial resampling. We also experimented with systematic and residual
resampling, but the choice of resampling method has a negligible impact on variance
estimates. Therefore, we opt for the simplest scheme.
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In addition, we make the number of particles Nt time-varying, increasing
their count in situations when future observations are weakly informative
about the states. We let the number of particles vary as Nt = Mt N̄ , where
the baseline particle count N̄ is set to 500, and the dynamic multiplier is a
smoothed version of raw multipliers defined below,
Mt =max(M̃max(t−99,1):t). (C22)
The computation of raw multiplier M̃ differs for the BA and CP case. In
the BA case, we first flag BA observations as informative if either the bid
or the ask changes (IN F Tt = 1). Then, we compute its forward-looking


















having more particles if price changes are less frequent in future periods.


















M̃ C Pt =min(⌈Zt⌉, 10). (C26)
This criterion increases the number of particles in cases the price is low
relative to the prevailing tick size. By taking the rolling maximum in
Equation (C22), we avoid frequent oscillation in the particle count when
the BA and CP cases switch due to lack of trading activity and imply a
different raw multiple.
The next ingredient in the implementation of the filter is specification
of the tick-size dt . We extract the values for each stock individually. For
each date we take the set of all quotes and trading prices (not midpoints)
that occurred up to date, and find the smallest difference among the prices
in the set. For the first 22 observations, we use the window of first 22
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days of prices. An advantage of this approach is its simplicity and that
it is able to capture aspects such as gradual implementation of quote
decimalization, or different rules of exchanges applying to cross-listed
stocks. One disadvantage of this procedure is that the tick reduction is
permanent. In particular, since for stocks priced below 1$ the tick sizes
are lower, recovery of the price above this threshold will result in an
underestimation of dt . The same issue may arise in case of quote errors, or
unusual quotes (ticks) on NASDAQ, where the size of price increments was
restricted by customs rather than formal rules. If the tick size is too low,
the observed and the latent quotes almost coincide and the filtered price is
close to the quote midpoint, due to the assumption of a symmetric spread.
We keep the parameters of the transition dynamics constant and iden-
tical for all stocks, which avoids the computational burden that would
stem from a formal estimation. We set the mean-reversion parameters ϕσ
and ϕχ to 0.999, implying a (prior) half-life of 623 days.
32 We fix the
reversion levels to log(σ̄ = log(0.5/252)) and χ̄ = log(log(1.25))− log(2).
However, the exact choice of the constant is not crucial due to relatively
long half-life of the processes. For the volatility in the mean spread, we
choose γχ = 0.02, motivated by slow variation in long-term spread levels.
To capture the spread oscillation around its local level, we let γc = 0.5. This
choice becomes vital to capture the spread volatility following the switch
to inside quotes for NASDAQ stocks in 1980. Finally, we set the volatility-
of-volatility to γσ = 0.1. This choice allows for fast changes in volatility. A
two-standard deviation increase over ten-day horizon corresponds to drop
of volatility by -53% or an increase by 88%.
Before applying the filtering procedure outlined above, we eliminate
outliers from the data, which often stem from data errors (unrepresentative
quotes). Panels A and B in Figure C1 show two such observations, one
corresponding to a closing price and the other to a bid-ask midpoint.
We identify suspicious quotes in the data by combining multiple criteria.
First, we flag as a quote error observations with extreme or unusually wide
32We also experimented with a unit root specification instead of mean-reverting process.
Overall, the estimates are barely affected by this choice, but the mean-reverting specification
is more robust to long, uninformative periods.
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Figure C1: CRSP problematic quotes
Description: Panel A: Example of a stock with outlier price observation, corresponding to
closing price. Panel B: Example of a stock with outlier price observation, corresponding to
quote midpoint. Panel C: Time series of outlier occurrences.
Interpretation: CRSP data contain numerous outliers, some of which correspond to data
errors or unrepresentative quotes. Data cleaning is therefore important.
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CQ1 = CES ∨ CUS . (C29)
Then, we add a criterion to capture extreme quotes, which still possibly
exhibit a reasonable (or less extreme) spread. First, we check whether
either the spread is wide (in absolute or relative terms) or the recorded




















∧ (A− B > 3), (C31)
COU T = (P > A)∨ (P < B). (C32)
and combine them to CQCS = CREL ∨ CABS ∨ COU T . Then, we compare
the log-bid and log-ask, adjusted for dividends and stock splits, with their
moving medians over a window of 9 days. We check the same criterion on
bid (ask) level as well, and consider the quote to be problematic if both
the level and logarithmic criteria hold. We combine the spread criterion




























CQ2 =CQTS ∧ CQCS , (C34)
CQ =CQ1 ∨ CQ2. (C35)
For the price series, we label the observation as suspicious if the log-price
is far away from its moving median over a window of five observations.
To avoid false positives for low-priced stocks, we also require the same
criterion to hold for price levels. Formally, we let
CPREL = |p−med(p, 5)|> 1, CPABS = |P −med(P, 5)|> 1. (C36)
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and CPTS = CPREL ∧ CPABS. In addition, we also treat all prices computed
as quote midpoint, when the quotes are erroneous (CQ holds) as an error,
CP : CPTS ∨ (CQ ∧Midpoint). In both cases we keep the last observation in
the sample, whether the criteria described above hold or not, so that we
do not exclude pre-delisting information. Table C1 provides examples of
detected errors by our cleaning procedure.33 Panel C in Figure C1 shows
that most of the outliers are detected around the dot-com bubble, the
financial crisis, and in the most recent period. The surge in the former two
periods likely reflects a combination of low liquidity and false positives. In
shallow markets, a huge price change may occur due to the price impact
of a block trade. Extreme quotes often occur due to the unwillingness of
the market maker to trade, motivating them to post extreme quotes. The
increase in the recent period is more puzzling, perhaps indicating that the
unrepresentative quotes are only gradually assessed and eliminated by
CRSP.
Using the criteria above we distinguish several cases. If both CP and CQ
hold (or quotes are unavailable) then we treat the observation as missing,
i.e., the NA case. If only CQ holds, we eliminate the quotes and use the
closing price only (CP). When the quotes are error-free, but the price is
not, the effect on our filtering procedure is limited, as in such cases we use
the quotes. Still, the price error might cause problems for the initialization
of the filter, so we convert an erroneous price to its previous value and
recompute the resulting returns.34
From the particle filter we compute two sets of estimates, a filtered
33In most cases, the presence of a quote “error” is clear. For example, in the second
line of Table C1, the observation is flagged as problematic because the ask/bid is too large.
With a wide bid-ask spread, the discrepancy between midpoints under assumptions of
a symmetric spread in levels and logs becomes large. As a consequence, the resulting
filtered returns might be large if the adjacent observations have either narrower spread
or do not have available quotes. As another example, the observation in the sixth block is
possibly a false positive, flagged because of its relatively low bid compared to neighboring
observations, and the fact that the price is outside of the quotes. As a consequence, the
filtering procedure uses the price instead of the quotes.
34Furthermore, price information might be missing for other reasons than our exclusion
of outliers, e.g., due to suspension from trading. We treat those missing values analogously,
i.e., as the NA case, unless there are missing values for more than 22 consecutive observation.
In such cases, the variance of the filter would be too large. Instead, we split the full data
range of the stock into connected segments, where no such gaps occur, and estimates the
states on each segment separately.
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ID Date PRC BID ASK BIDLO ASKHI RET Mid
10001 03-Aug-2009 8.050 8.050 8.150 7.750 8.340 -0.012 false
10001 04-Aug-2009 8.600 7.750 999.990 8.400 8.600 0.068 false
10001 05-Aug-2009 8.578 8.350 8.600 7.960 8.590 -0.003 false
10042 05-Aug-1999 0.188 - - 0.156 0.188 0.200 false
10042 06-Aug-1999 0.172 0.031 0.313 0.031 0.313 -0.083 true
10042 09-Aug-1999 0.156 - - 0.156 0.188 -0.091 false
10100 11-Apr-2008 1.050 0.820 1.280 0.820 1.280 -0.014 true
10100 14-Apr-2008 2.595 0.710 4.480 0.710 4.480 1.471 true
10100 15-Apr-2008 1.035 0.820 1.250 0.820 1.250 -0.601 true
10100 09-May-2008 1.025 0.850 1.200 0.850 1.200 0.000 true
10100 12-May-2008 0.850 0.350 1.780 0.850 0.850 -0.171 false
10100 13-May-2008 1.065 0.850 1.280 0.850 1.280 0.253 true
10100 26-Sep-2008 0.775 0.670 0.880 0.670 0.880 -0.119 true
10100 29-Sep-2008 0.880 0.250 1.250 0.880 0.880 0.136 false
10100 30-Sep-2008 0.670 0.790 0.880 0.670 0.790 -0.239 false
10100 18-Dec-2008 0.520 0.490 0.550 0.490 0.550 -0.096 true
10100 19-Dec-2008 0.310 0.390 0.440 0.310 0.530 -0.404 false
10100 22-Dec-2008 0.310 0.310 0.820 0.310 0.310 0.000 false
10100 13-Jan-2009 0.600 0.710 0.790 0.600 0.680 -0.143 false
10100 14-Jan-2009 1.390 0.040 2.740 0.040 2.740 1.317 true
10100 15-Jan-2009 0.725 0.680 0.770 0.680 0.770 -0.478 true
10205 26-Sep-2008 12.000 11.900 12.010 12.000 12.970 -0.016 false
10205 29-Sep-2008 10.800 6.000 12.100 9.050 12.100 -0.100 false
10205 30-Sep-2008 10.650 10.650 10.660 10.550 12.440 -0.014 false
10232 09-Dec-2013 25.200 23.350 29.750 23.201 25.200 0.019 false
10232 10-Dec-2013 110.035 23.400 196.670 23.400 196.670 3.366 true
10232 11-Dec-2013 24.010 23.520 25.000 23.310 25.250 -0.782 false
10256 28-Jun-2001 0.600 0.530 0.600 0.550 0.600 0.091 false
10256 29-Jun-2001 0.550 0.110 3.000 0.550 0.570 -0.083 false
10256 02-Jul-2001 0.550 0.500 0.550 0.490 0.550 0.000 false
Table C1: Examples of flagged observations by error detection procedure.
Description: Table of first ten detected errors. Each block shows period t − 1 to t + 1 for
an error detected for time t. ID column contains PERMNO, i.e., the CRSP security identifier.
PRC is the price series, i.e., an absolute value of price series from CRSP database. BID
and ASK are the closing or inside quotes, depending on exchange under consideration.
BIDLO and ASKHI are the closing (inside) quotes when the trading price is not available
(Midpoint), and the daily low and high price otherwise. Mid indicates whether the price
corresponds to quote midpoint.
Interpretation: The error identification procedure successfully identifies many problematic
quotes that often generate huge artificial returns.
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series and a smoothed series. The latter is obtained from a fixed-lag ap-
proximation using L = 100. While other smoothing methods might be
preferable, we opt for the fixed-lag approximation for its simplicity and
low computational cost, which is of practical relevance given that we apply
the filter for approximately 24,000 stocks.
